
WASHINGTON 
1917 



RUDOLPH SCHLEIDEN AND THE VISIT 
TO RICHMOND, APRIL 25, 1861 



RALPH HASWELL LUTZ 



Reprinted from the Annual Report of the American Historical Association 
for 1915, pages 207-216 




WASHINGTON 
1917 



E4M 
>U18 



n 1929, 



V 



XL RUDOLF SCHLEIDEN AND THE VISIT TO RICHMOND, 
APRIL 25, 1861. 



By Ralph Haswell Lutz, 
Assistant Professor in the University of Washington. 



207 



RUDOLF SCHLEIDEN AND THE VISIT TO RICHMOND, APRIL 25, 

1861. 1 



By Ralph Haswell Lutz. 



While working in Germany on the subject of " The relations be- 
tween Germany and the United States during the Civil War," I 
secured permission from the Senate of Bremen to study in the State 
Archives. In these archives are preserved the dispatches of the min- 
ister resident, Dr. Schleiden, from 1861 to 1864, and the dispatches of 
the Hanseatic Legation from 1864 to 1865. « Dr. von Bippen, the State 
archivist of Bremen, gave access to all the diplomatic correspondence 
of Schleiden while Minister at Washington, except three confidential 
dispatches of 1861 — Schleiden's No. 50, No. 51, and No. 52 of April 
24 and May 2 to the committee of foreign affairs of Bremen — which 
dealt with Schleiden's peace negotiations at Eichmond. 

These dispatches are now in my possession. Mr. Frederic Ban- 
croft, when editing the now published correspondence of Carl Schurz, 
found among the Schurz papers copies of these confidential docu- 
ments. Mr. E. D. Adams had translations made of these three dis- 
patches, as well as of the other Schleiden manuscripts in the Schurz 
papers, and to these I have had access. This paper is a study of 
these documents and the diplomatic correspondence examined at 
Bremen. 

Rudolf Mathias Schleiden was born on the family estate at Asche- 
berg, in Schleswig, July 22, 1815. After taking his doctor's degree 
at the University of Berlin, he entered the Danish customs service, 
in which he remained until the rebellion of Schleswig-Holstein from 
Denmark in 1848. Leaving Copenhagen he hastened to Kiel and re- 
ceived from the provisional government of the duchies an appoint- 
ment as delegate to the parliament of Frankfort, which was then as- 
sembling to formulate a constitution for Germany. At the capital 
of the German confederation he became acquainted with Dr. Johann 
Smidt, Bremen's greatest statesman and one of the founders of 
Germany's commercial greatness. After the failure of the German 
liberal movement of 1848, Schleiden withdrew to Bremen, and in 
1853 was appointed minister of that Republic to the United States. 



»This paper was read at the meeting of the Pacific coast branch, Nov. 27, 1915. 
63871°— 17 14 209 



210 



AMERICAN HISTORICAL ASSOCIATION. 



No foreign diplomat watched the approaching Civil War with such 
concern and knowledge of events as Schleiden. " Since the times 
of the Revolutionary War," he wrote his Government on New Year's 
day, "no year has begun under such threatening conditions for the 
United States as the year 1861." Almost all the democratic leaders 
whom Schleiden met in the diplomatic society of the Capital were 
open advocates of secession. Even Seward's speech in the Senate 
on January 14 failed to allay the growing sentiment, Schleiden re- 
ported to his Government. After the close of that memorable ad- 
dress, which many hoped would suggest a panacea for the national 
ills, Hemphill of Texas exclaimed to Schleiden : " That would have 
been a fine address for the Fourth of July, but we are going to secede." 

But while all the southern statesmen were preparing for secession, 
Seward calmly assured the minister of Bremen that secession was a 
party game, and, with the commencement of the new administration, 
order would return. Then, on the 26th of January, the future Secre- 
tary of State unfolded to Schleiden that fantastic plan of provoking 
a foreign war, which Lincoln a few months later so wisely ignored. 
" If the Lord would only give the United States an excuse for a war 
with England, France, or Spain," Seward said, " that would be the 
best means of reestablishing internal peace." Again on February 
10, Seward conversed with Schleiden on this subject and complained 
that momentarily there was no foreign complication which offered 
an excuse to break with a foreign power. 

Although Schleiden believed this plan too intricate to be danger- 
ous, he nevertheless was extremely anxious to ascertain Lincoln's 
views on foreign policy. On February 26 he reported to his Gov- 
ernment that, " like a thief in the night, the future President arrived 
here on the early morning of the 23d." Several days later Schleiden 
was introduced to Lincoln, and two days before the inauguration he 
gave a dinner in honor of Lincoln. Gen. Scott, four of the future 
cabinet officers, and several diplomats were present. The general, 
who sat next to the President, remarked, during the course of the 
dinner, that he had not voted for Lincoln, as he had not exercised 
his right to vote for 54 years. " But I have voted for you, general," 
was Lincoln's quick reply, " and you will have to make up for it in 
war." Still he remarked to the other members of the dinner party 
that he didn't hope to give the general a chance very soon. 

As became a good diplomat of the old school, Schleiden discussed 
diplomacy with the President-elect after dinner. About the only 
thing he learned to inform his Government was, however, the terse 
statement : " I don't know anything about diplomacy. I will be very 
apt to make blunders." To illustrate the President's humor even in 
the face of the disruption of the Union, Schleiden related to his 



KUDOLF SCHLEIDEN AND THE VISIT TO RICHMOND. 211 

Government that when the peace commissioners of Virginia to the 
conference at Washington asked Lincoln to remove the Federal 
troops from Fort Sumter, the President replied: "Why not? If 
you will guarantee to me the State of Virginia I shall remove the 
troops. A State for a fort is no bad business." 

The fall of Fort Sumter and the threatening prospect of a general 
war had cast a gloom over Washington, and none felt it more keenly 
than Schleiden. The chief interest of Bremen in America lay in the 
carrying trade with Europe. The red and white banner of the 
little Hanseatic Kepublic floated from the masts of more ships in 
American ports than the flag of any other foreign nation excepting 
Great Britain. To avert civil war and the consequent disruption of 
trade seemed to Schleiden a foremost duty. He became, therefore, an 
earnest advocate of mediation, but toward the end of April, 1861, 
the planned mediation of the diplomatic corps failed. In fact, on 
April 23 Seward published a communication from the State Depart- 
ment to the governor of Maryland, which declared that the differ- 
ences between the States could not be submitted to any foreign 
arbitrament under any circumstances. 

Schleiden thereupon offered his services to Seward in the hope 
that he alone might be able to mediate an armistice which would 
maintain a peaceful status until Congress could assemble. On the 
morning of April 24 Schleiden discussed the question with Seward. 
As Alexander H. Stephens, Vice President of the Southern Con- 
federacy, was then in Eichmond, Schleiden proposed to journey 
to the capital of Virginia and commence confidential discussions 
with him. Seward at once favored this plan, but stated that " neither 
the President nor the entire Cabinet could expressly authorize such 
pourparlers or draw up conditions under which it would be willing 
to entertain an armistice." 

Later in the day Schleiden had a conference with President Lincoln 
and Secretary Seward. Lincoln expressed his hearty thanks that 
Schleiden was " willing to make an attempt of contributing to the 
prevention of bloodshed, and regretted that Schleiden had not gone 
to Eichmond without consulting him or Seward." However, when 
Schleiden explained that such a course would have laid him open 
to the suspicion of intriguing with the South against the sole legiti- 
mately recognized Government, Lincoln agreed with him. The 
President stated that his designs for peace as expressed in his official 
statements had given ground through misinterpretation to the charge 
of imbecility and fear, and that he had resolved not to discuss the 
subject further. He repeated that "he did not have in mind any 
aggression against the Southern States, but merely the safety of the 
Government in the capital and the possibility to govern everywhere." 



212 



AMERICAN HISTORICAL ASSOCIATION. 



On this account Lincoln said that he could neither authorize negotia- 
tions nor invite proposals, but he promised to consider carefully all 
proposals which Schleiden might find himself called upon to submit. 

The manner in which the President expressed himself seemed to 
indicate to Schleiden that he desired him to attempt negotiations 
with Stephens without any special authorization. "I therefore 
tried," Schleiden wrote to his Government, " to cause the gentlemen 
to state whether the suspension of all hostilities for the term of three 
months would be accepted under a simultaneous revocation of the 
two opposing proclamations, the one referring to the issue of letters 
of marque and reprisal, the other to the blockade of the southern 
ports." Lincoln declined nevertheless to make any definite state- 
ment. Seward, who was determined to send Schleiden, prevailed 
upon him to commence negotiations without any definite proposals, 
and procured for him a pass through the Union lines. On the evening 
of April 24 Schleiden departed secretly for Kichmond and arrived 
on the afternoon of the next day. 

On the railway journey through northern Virginia Schleiden dis- 
covered that conditions were decidedly unfavorable to his plan for an 
armistice. Volunteers crowded the stations. The newspapers de- 
manded in stirring articles an immediate attack on Washington and 
denounced any attempt by the South to secure a truce. In Richmond 
the ordinance of secession had just been published, and on the day of 
Schleiden's arrival the State convention ratified the provisional con- 
stitution of the Southern Confederacy. The lobby of the hotel at 
which he stayed was filled with excited politicians anxious to ascertain 
the aim of his trip. 

Immediately on arriving in Richmond, Schleiden wrote to Vice 
President Stephens asking for an interview, to which the latter re- 
plied that he would be happy to see him immediately. During the 
course of a confidential talk which lasted for three hours Stephens de- 
clared that he believed all attempts to settle peacefully the differences 
between the two sections were futile. " The actions of Seward and 
Lincoln had filled the South with suspicion," Stephens said, "but 
neither the Government at Montgomery nor the authorities of Vir- 
ginia contemplated an attack on Washington." He added that if 
Walker, the southern secretary of war, had said after the fall of Fort 
Sumter that he hoped to be in Washington on May 1, it was merely 
a flowery phrase. " Public opinion was embittered against the United 
States because of the strengthening of Fort Pickens and Fort Monroe, 
and the destruction of the arsenal at Harper's Ferry, and the navy 
yard at Norfolk. Maryland's unexpected rising in favor of the South 
seemed to make it a condition of peace that Maryland be allowed to 
join the Southern Confederacy." 



RUDOLF SCH LEIDEN AND THE VISIT TO RICHMOND. 213 

In view of these facts Stephens favored a " de facto truce through 
tactful avoidance of an attack on both sides," rather than a formal 
armistice. As he had no authorization to make a binding declaration 
in the name of the Confederacy, he asked for time to consider Schlei- 
den 's proposals, and " declared himself ready at the same time to 
accept a letter from Schleiden on the subject of the armistice and to 
answer the same." 

In a formal letter, written after the conference, Schleiden asked for 
a frank statement of the terms which the South would be ready to 
grant and accept for the purpose of securing the maintenance of peace 
and gaining time for reflection. " I believe that your complying with 
my above request," wrote Schleiden, " offers the last prospect of at- 
taining a peaceful solution of the present crisis." 

To this letter Stephens replied, stating that the Government of the 
Confederacy had resorted to every honorable means to avoid war, and 
that if the United States had any desire to adjust amicably the ques- 
tions at issue it should indicate its willingness in some authoritative 
way to the South. However, he added, referring to the United States, 
" it seems to be their policy to wage a war for the recapture of former 
possessions looking to the ultimate coercion and subjugation of the 
people of the Confederate States to their power and domain. With 
such an object on their part persevered in, no power on earth can 
arrest or prevent a most bloody conflict." 

After a last conference with Stephens, Schleiden returned to Wash- 
ington, reaching the Capital on the afternoon of the 27th. Immedi- 
ately upon his arrival he addressed a letter to President Lincoln, in- 
closing his correspondence with Stephens. After stating that the 
Southern States were arming in self-defense, he reported that if the 
South were assured the President would recommend to Congress when 
it assembles on July 4 a speedy and amicable adjustment of the dif- 
ferences and the propriety of treating with commissioners of the 
Southern States, there would not be any danger of a conflict. 

At the request of the President, Seward replied to this letter in 
an unofficial and confidential communication from the Department of 
State. Seward informed Schleiden that Lincoln was of the opinion 
that a continuance of the negotiations would be without any beneficial 
result. In view of this fact, Schleiden wrote to Stephens : 

It is only now and with deep regret that I can inform you that my attempt at 
contributing toward gaining time for reflection and if possible a favorable ad- 
justment of the existing differences has failed. 

Finally, on May 2, 1861, Schleiden wrote to his Government: 

I regret to report to the honorable Senate committee that my attempts to 
mediate a truce and thereby to furnish the opposing parties time for quiet re- 
flection has not been successful. 



[ 



214 AMERICAN" HISTORICAL ASSOCIATION. 

Such a step as Schleiden took in these negotiations is almost an 
unheard of thing in the annals of modern diplomacy. His visit to 
Richmond is undoubtedly the last effort to bring about a compromise 
between North and South. Of primary importance is the fact that 
Schleiden was practically sent to Richmond by Seward. Is not this 
incident unknown to history ? 

After the failure of his visit to Richmond, Schleiden was soon 
busied with the various diplomatic questions arising out of the begin- 
ning of the Civil War. When the principal powers of Europe issued 
declarations of neutrality in the War between the States, Schleiden 
asked his Government for instructions. Nothing exhibits the friend- 
liness of Bremen for the Union more than the simple reply of the 
senate that there was no necessity for issuing any sort of declaration. 
In fact, Southern newspapers were continually announcing in large 
headlines, " Free cities of Germany aid the Lincoln despotism." 

The news of the capture of Mason and Slidell fell like a thunder- 
bolt on the diplomats at Washington. War appeared inevitable. 
"However one may consider this affair from a judicial standpoint, 
it is a great misfortune," Schleiden wrote home. On December 14 he 
had an interview with Seward, who assured him that the affair would 
be settled peacefully with England. At the same time Seward denied 
most emphatically that Wilkes had acted under instructions from 
Secretary Welles of the Navy, and added : " I don't care a bit what 
Mr. Welles said." 

Despite the peaceful assurances of Seward, Schleiden was extremely 
pessimistic, believing that the differences in the cabinet precluded 
any statesmanlike adjustment of the difficulty. Just a few days before 
his interview with the Secretary of State, Blair said to him : 

Mr. Seward is a transcendental philosopher, with no faith in his own philos- 
ophy, and a tricky politician who believes only in the meanest arts. 

With such differences in the cabinet, Schleiden informed the sen- 
ate of Bremen that the only hope in peace lay in the judgment of 
Lincoln. "The President," he also wrote that body, "has stated 
that no instructions were sent to Wilkes, and he is incapable of an 
intentional untruth." Several days after the arrival of the instruc- 
tions of the British cabinet for Lord Lyons, Schleiden had a long talk 
with him and gathered that the affair would be peacefully settled. 
When the commissioners were finally released he wrote to Bremen : 

The moral courage with which the Government, and especially Mr. Seward, 
have withstood public opinion deserves, at least, recognition. 

Later in the war, when Lincoln placed Admiral Wilkes in command 
of the squadron at San Francisco he spoke of it to Schleiden as a 
pacific measure. 



4 



BUDOLF SCHLEIDEN AND THE VISIT TO RICHMOND. 215 

The dramatic arrival of the French dispatch advising the release 
of Mason and Slidell at the very moment when the cabinet was 
discussing the subject is a matter of history. The Austrian and 
Prussian notes, which were of the same tenor, arrived too late to 
have any influence on the decision. Seward nevertheless accepted 
them as a token of national good will and had the texts published, 
although Schleiden informed his Government that Seward pri- 
vately condemned the action of the two powers, saying that all good 
advice was annoying after one had made up one's mind. In the 
spring of 1862 Schleiden asked his Government for a leave of ab- 
sence in order to return to Europe. Seward had especially advised 
him to embrace the moment to visit Germany, although the Secre- 
tary of War said, " You had better wait 60 days, in order to see the 
complete end of the rebellion." Schleiden regarded the outlook 
as extremely unfavorable. Simon Cameron, with whom Schleiden 
had an interview before sailing, shared this view, and added, by 
way of explanation : " We want a great man and have not got him, 
but I ought not to have said that." 

Schleiden did not return from Europe until December, 1862. 
While in Paris he was received on December 18 by the French 
minister of foreign affairs, Drouyn de Lhuys, who discussed Ameri- 
can affairs with him at great length. " I am concerned with neither 
Union nor disunion, neither with slavery nor with abolition," he 
said. While at Bremen Schleiden had been appointed minister at 
Washington for the two other Hanseatic cities of Hamburg and 
Liibeck, and on his return to his post he presented his new creden- 
tials. Owing to the cabinet crisis the President did not formally 
receive him until December 23. 

The emancipation policy and affairs in Mexico were now engag- 
ing the attention of the diplomatic corps. Schleiden was opposed 
to the freeing of the slaves at that juncture and often cited the 
query of Machiavelli as to whether it was harder to make freemen 
slaves or slaves free. He was extremely pessimistic, too, regarding 
the condition of affairs in Mexico and considered a war with France 
as being far from an impossibility. In private conversation with 
Schleiden, Seward expressed himself very strongly against the 
French, whose expulsion from Mexico he regarded as merely a 
matter of time. The French minister at Washington repeatedly 
said to Schleiden in speaking of Mexico, "It is my nightmare." 

Many of Schleiden's dispatches related purely to military affairs 
and often contained biting sarcasm. In the summer of 1863 he 
wrote to Bremen that Lincoln remarked after the Battle of Chan- 
cellorsville : " We would have won, had Hooker fallen on the morn- 
ing of May 2." After Gettysburg Schleiden informed his Govern- 



216 



AMERICAN HISTORICAL ASSOCIATION. 



ment that Lincoln was disgusted with Meade's ability as a strategist 
because he had not taken up a position between Lee and the Potomac 
to fight a decisive battle. 

The reelection of Lincoln was almost unanimously predicted by 
the diplomatic corps in J anuary, 1864. In February Schleiden men- 
tioned in a dispatch that Lincoln said to Judge Thomas, of Massa- 
chusetts, that he would be satisfied if his successor was elected 
from the Republican Party. If that did not take place the Presi- 
dent feared that he would spend the rest of his life in jail for 
repeated violations of the Constitution. About this time Chase 
remarked to Schleiden that the war would never end so long as 
Lincoln was President. In the spring of 1864 Schleiden left Wash- 
ington for Europe to return only after the Civil War had become 
a matter of history. 

Schleiden was one of the most popular members of the diplomatic 
corps at Washington during the period of the Civil War. His 
voluminous dispatches to the senate of Bremen contain excellent 
contemporary views and accurate accounts of the great men and 
events of the struggle. The vividness of his comments, his accuracy, 
and above all his profound knowledge of American affairs, make his 
diplomatic correspondence valuable source material for the history 
of the war. In conclusion I wish to express the hope that some 
day these dispatches of Schleiden may be published. 



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